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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LOA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appella;nt,
vs.
ELIZABETH F. SYME, Administratrix of the Estate of Bailey Syme,
Deceased,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL
No. 8547

APPELLANTS PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

PETITION
Comes now the plaintiff and ·appellant, Loa Johnson,
by her counsel, and respectfully petitions the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, to grant to the plaintiff and
appellant a rehearing in the .above entitled cause. This
petition is based upon the Statement of Points and Arguments which follow.
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POINT I.
THE COURT IN ITS OPINION FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, VIZ.
THAT APPELLANT'S INJURIES WERE A PROXIMATE RESULT OF WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT ON THE
PART OF THE DECEASED.

ARGUMENT
In the appellant's complaint, two causes of action
were pleaded: _The first cause of action alleged that
her injuries were the proximate result of negligent conduct on the part of the deceased, Bailey Syme. The second
cause of action alleged that the appellant was injured
by the willful and wanton misconduct of the decedent.
The lower court dismissed both causes of action and
appellant raised on appeal to this court the propriety of
both dismissals.
This court in its "Titten opinion .and :Jir. Justice
W ase in his dissenting opinion dealt entirely "ith the dismissal of the first cause of action. Both opinions ·were
devoted

solel~v

to a discussion of whether the appellant

was guilty of contributory negligence as a n1atter of lmY.
Neither opinion considered the propriety of the lower
con rt '~ ruling dis1nissing the second cause of action which
wa;s botton1ed on \Yillful and wanton n1isconduct of the
deceased.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
The grave importance of this omission is that even
though the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence' as a matter of law (as a majority of the court concluded) her negligence in no way bar.s her recovery for
injuries inflicted by the willful and wanton misconduct of
the deceased. Jensen vs. D. & R. G. Ry. Co., 44 Utah 100,
111, 138 Pac. 1185, citing 2 Cooley on Torts, 3rd Ed., pg.
1442.
In his treatise on the Law of Torts, Sec. 151, pg.
324, Professor Harper points out that ''willful and
wanton" misconduct or "reckless and wanton" misconduct consist of acts or omissions which involve a higher
degree of culpability than acts which are merely negligent. He states:
"Such conduct differs from wilful harm in
that defendant does not act for the purpose of
harming the plaintiff; it differs from negligence
in that the actor knows and is full conscious that
his conduct involves .a grave risk to others
whereas in merely negligent conduct, it may be
that the actor does not realize the danger to others
but, as a reasonable man, should recognize the
nature and extent of the risk."
Harper quotes approvingly from Atchison, T. etc.
R. Co. vs. Baker, 79 Kans. 183, 98 Pac. 804, 21 L.R.A.
(N. S.) 427, wherein the court stated:
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"One who is properly charged with recklessness or wantonness is not simply more careless
than one who is guilty of negligence; his conduct
must be such as to put him in the class with the
wilful doer of wrong. The only respect in which
his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the
intentional wrongdoer is that instead of affirmatively wishing to injure ~another, he is merely
willing to do so. The difference is that between
him who casts a missile intending that it shall
strike another, and him who casts it where he has
reason to believe it will strike another, being indifferent whether it does or not."
Harper further points out that by the rule established in a number of states .a defendant may be guilty
of "reckless and wanton" misconduct e1;en though he did
not know of the plaintiff's presence, if the probability

of his presence was very high and the defendant's activity
was dangerous.
"The fundamental characteristic of reckless
misconduct is that it usually indicates an indifference on the part of a person to the safety of others
and such indifference may be shown, it would
seem, in cases where the actual presence of the
other is not known, if the chances of his presence
and the gravity of his peril, if present. are sufficiently great to establish a consciousness on the
part of the defendant that he is creating an unreasonable risk."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Applying Profe.ssor Harper's definition and examples to the instant caHe, it is clear that there is evidence of "willful and wanton" misconduct on the part
of Bailey Syme, the deceased. As appe.ars in the

st~ate

ment of facts in the opinion of this court, he drove along
a courrtry road at a speed of 40 m.p.h., past a stop sign
and thence onto a bu.sy four lane transcontinental highway where automobiles were tr.aveling at or about the
speed limit of 50 m.p.h. Whether he failed to see the
stop sign or whether he saw it and disregarded it is not
known, and makes no difference here. He at least knew
or is chargeable with knowledge that he was approaching
State Street, a heavily traveled thoroughfare where
automobiles customarily travel at 50 m.p.h. Yet he drove
onto State Street without stopping, directly into the path
of the plaintiff. Here, in the words of Profe.ssor Harper,
"the probability of the plaintiff's presence was very
high and the activity of the defendant very dangerous
to life and limb." B.ailey Syme was indifferent to the
safety of others. While he may no)t have actually wished
to injure anyone, he was at least willing to do so. The
intent to injure some one is not a necessary ingredient of
"willful misconduct." Cope vs. Davison, Cal., 180 P. 2d
873; Tighe vs. Diamond, 149 Oh. St. 520, 80 N. E. 2d 122.
"Willful" or "wanton" misconduct is such disregard of
known duty necessary to the s.afe,ty of the person and
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entire absence of care for life, person or property of
others as exhibits a consciou.s indifference to the consequences, said the Illinois Court in Pittman vs. Duggan,
336 Ill. App. 502, 84 N. E. 2d 701, 703. Certainly Bailey
Syme in driving onto U.S. 91 without first stopping and
waiting until the traffic cleared fits well the definition by
the Illinois Court. His conduct was more than merely
negligent. It was willful and wanton, and the plaintiff's
contributory negligence in failing to see him sooner does
not har her recovery, Jensen vs. D. & R. G Ry. Co., supra.
The conduct of Bailey Syme in running the stop sign
and driving onto busy State Street where a constant
stream of automobile•s race by at 50 m.p.h. was not much
less "willful and wanton" than had he fired a gun into a
crowd of people.
Had the plaintiff been a guest in the automobil~
Brailey Syme and were she now bringing this action under
our guest statute ( 41-9-1, U.C.A. 1953) where "''illful
and wanton" misconduct is required to be shown, this
court, we predict, would not hesitate to hold that the facts
justified submission of the case to a jury. In fact, the
instant ca.se is stronger on its facts than any guest case
which has been decided by this court. The conduct of
Bailey Syme was n1ore dangerous to life and limb than
that of the defendant in Stack vs. J{ earns, 221 P. 2d 594,
where he drove .around a curve at an excessive rate of
speed while hraking at the smne tin1e.
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Further, as pointed out in appellant's original brief,
the conduct of Bailey Syme would warrant his conviction
of involuntary manslaughter had the plaintiff been killed
and Syme survived. See State vs. Lingman; State vs.

Barker; State v.s. Anderson, cited in original brief.
CONCLUSION
It must be remembered that this case was dismissed

by the court at a pretrial conference. The plaintiff has
never had "her day in court." She has never had the
opportunity of presenting to the court and jury her
evidence of "willful'' .and "wanton" misconduct. Clearly,
a jury question was made out by the offer of proof made
by the plaintiff at the pre-trial hearing. This court should
grant a re-hearing and consider at length the plaintiff's
second cau.se of action bottomed on willful and wanton
misconduct.
Respectfully submitted,

LEE W. HOBBS
Attorney for Appellant
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